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Abstract 
This paper reviews Thailand’s structural changes, the 1997 crisis experience, and recovery 
and lessons from the crisis. The paper then discusses the impacts of the subprime crisis on 
the Thai economy and the policy responses to date. The paper ends by discussing 
strategies to rebalance growth by reducing the dependence on exports as the main growth 
engine. 
The recovery from the 1997 crisis left Thailand more dependent than ever on exports as the 
main engine of growth, with the ratio of exports to gross domestic product (GDP) increasing 
from a precrisis level of about 38% to about 65% recently. The lessons learned from the 
1997 crisis led to a more risk-averse financial system, and this helped Thailand avoid the 
direct impacts of the subprime crisis. However, being highly dependent on exports, Thailand, 
along with other export oriented East Asian economies, is now heavily affected by the 
indirect impacts of the subprime crisis, especially in the export industries. Exports and GDP 
have dropped sharply over the past two quarters. 
The government has been using fiscal stimulus and monetary easing measures to try to 
improve the economy. These measures are mostly short-term in nature, and if the subprime 
crisis is protracted, then the sustainability of the fiscal stimulus will be called into question. In 
the medium- to long-term, Thailand needs to move to a more balanced growth path, 
depending less on exports (although exports will still be important) and more on other, 
domestic sources of growth. The paper concludes by discussing a number of policy 
strategies that will contribute to a more balanced growth path. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper starts by reviewing Thailand’s 1997 crisis and recovery experiences. Through 
macroeconomic mismanagement, by mid-1997 the country basically became insolvent in 
terms of not having enough useable foreign reserves to back up its foreign currency 
obligations, and had to abandon the basket peg and float the baht. Recovery was slow and 
was driven mainly by the export engine. Lessons learned from the crisis and postcrisis 
reforms led to a more risk-averse financial system, and this helped to shield the Thai 
financial system from the direct impacts of the subprime crisis. However, the indirect impacts 
through the trade channel have been very severe. The paper highlights the fiscal and 
monetary policy responses that have been carried out. It suggests that these measures are 
mainly short-term in nature and have not yet addressed the need to rebalance Thailand’s 
growth path to be sustainable and less dependent on the export engine in the future. The 
paper ends by discussing some key strategies that could help Thailand achieve a more 
balanced and sustainable growth path. 
2.  CRISIS AND RECOVERY 
As one of the most vibrant economies in the region for past several decades, Thailand has 
undergone continued restructuring of its economy. Starting from a resource-based 
agricultural economy in the 1960s, the country moved with considerable speed toward light 
industrialization. A policy shift to export orientation in the late 1970s brought about the 
fastest growing episode of the Thai economy from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s. During 
this period, both exports (especially exports of manufactured products) and investment 
played major roles as engines of growth. A realignment of major currencies after the Plaza 
Accord was also regarded as a driving force behind this extraordinary growth. Unfortunately, 
the episode was also characterized by a bubble and massive speculation, where 
investments were made with little regard to sound and supportive economic fundamentals. It 
was only a matter of time before the whole structure would collapse, and it did in the 
economic crisis of 1997.  
The economic crisis of 1997 not only put an end to the hyper-growth era, it has caused one 
of the most abrupt and profound restructurings of the Thai economy. Due to the authorities’ 
futile attempt to defend the value of the baht, Thailand used up almost all of its foreign 
reserves and by mid 1997 became essentially insolvent, in the sense that its foreign 
reserves were insufficient to meet its foreign currency obligations. The baht was floated on 2 
July 1997 and Thailand had to seek assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
The baht float resulted in a depreciation of more than 50% in the first six months. Firms that 
relied on foreign borrowing to finance their investments faced huge balance sheet problems 
and credit difficulties. Most of these firms could not service their debt which became 
nonperforming loans, and some corporations ceased to operate and vanished. Many of 
these corporations used to be among the country’s leading firms that drove the economic 
growth. As a result, aggregate investment and private consumption fell sharply and the 
economy contracted by more than 10% in 1998. 
Because of the large depreciation of the baht and the economic contraction, the current 
account turned from a precrisis deficit of about US$1 billion per month to a surplus of about 
US$1 billion per month toward the end of 1997. Thailand’s foreign reserve position 
recovered fairly quickly. By the middle of 1999, the usable foreign reserves had increased to 
more than US$16 billion, from approximately US$2.8 billion in the middle of 1997, and 
Thailand did not need to draw any more from the IMF loan package. 
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Even though the foreign reserve position recovered fairly quickly, it took much longer for an 
overall economic recovery to be achieved. From Figure 1, it can be seen that the economy 
bottomed out around the third quarter of 1998. However, it took almost five years before 
output recovered to its precrisis peak. It took even longer to clean up non-performing loans 
in the financial system. After the crisis, the ratio of nonperforming loans in the financial 
system jumped to almost 50% by the end of 1998 (Figure 2). It took about eight years after 
the onset of the crisis before the NPL ratio declined below 10%. 
Figure 1: Real GDP Trend 
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Figure 2: Ratio of Nonperforming Loans in the Financial System 
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With a slow recovery in the output level, there was a lot of excess capacity in the economy 
and little need for new private investment. At the same time, much of the corporate sector 
was going through debt restructuring and did not have the financial capacity for new 
investment either. Thus, investment declined substantially from the precrisis level and 
contributed little to the postcrisis recovery. The share of investment in GDP declined by more 
than half from the precrisis level; from above 40% precrisis to less than 20% in 1998 (see 
Figure 3). The ratio has remained less than 25% to the present day. While the precrisis ratio 
was too high, given the speculative bubble at that time, the current ratio is still much lower 
that what one might expect in a normal situation; for example, the average ratio from 1985-
1990 was about 30%. The recovery from the crisis to a semblance of a normal economic 
situation took about eight years. Unfortunately, Thailand has since been hit by a period of 
political turmoil, and this has kept the economy from going back to anything like its normal 
growth path. 
While domestic demand has played a relatively minor role in postcrisis growth, it has been 
the external sector (exports of goods and services) that has provided the growth impetus 
since the crisis. This is not too surprising. Thailand was an export-led economy prior to the 
crisis, so that with further stimulus coming from the depreciation of the baht, the export 
sector was able to easily respond and provided the impetus for the growth and recovery of 
the economy. Given that investment has not yet fully recovered, the export sector has 
continued to be the main engine of growth, until the recent adverse impacts of the subprime 
crisis. 
Figure 3: Ratio of Investments to GDP, 1990-2008 (in %) 
































Note: calculated at current baht value. 
Source: National Economic and Social Development Board. 
Table 1: Share of Export of Goods and Services to GDP, Various Countries (in %) 
Country 1990–1996  1997–2006  Differences
a  2006 
Indonesia  26.3  35.6 9.3 30.9 
Republic  of  Korea    27.2 39.9 12.6 43.2 
Malaysia  83.2 114.9 31.8 117.0 
Philippines  32.6 50.2 17.6 46.4 
Thailand  37.9 64.6 26.7 73.7 
a In absolute terms, not percentage difference, ie basis points. 
Source: World Development Indicators 2008. 
The role played by the export sector was important in helping to cushion the impacts of the 
crisis on the poor. Higher domestic prices of agricultural commodities, a result of the 
currency depreciation, helped the rural sector to absorb some of the urban areas laid-off 
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workers, particularly from the construction and manufacturing sectors. Other export sectors 
also helped in this regard. Even so, unemployment in both the rural and urban areas and 
poverty incidence increased in Thailand after the crisis.
1 
With exports as the main growth sector, the share of export of goods and services (including 
tourism) to GDP rose from an average of about 38% during 1990-1996 to an average of 
about 65% during 1997-2006, and increase of 26.7%. This is not uncommon among 
countries hit by the 1997 crisis as can be seen in Table 1. It must be noted, however, that 
Thailand’s increased dependence on exports is more pronounced than most countries. For 
example, Korea’s export share in GDP increased by 12.6 % and that of Philippines 
increased by 17.6% during the same period. The exception in Table 1 is Malaysia, with an 
increase in export share in GDP of 31.8% during the same period. It can be seen that 
Malaysia’s economy is extremely open, with the ratio of exports to GDP greater than 100% 
in recent years.
2 
Most of the increase in merchandise exports in the postcrisis period came from the 
manufacturing sector (Figure 4). This is not that surprising, as the structure of Thailand’s 
exports has been increasingly shifting toward manufacturing over the past three decades, 
and manufactured exports now account for about 88% of total exports. However, within 
manufacturing, there are different types of sectors, such as food, labor intensive sectors, 
more technologically based sectors, as well as resource based sectors, such as chemicals 
and petroleum. To better illustrate how Thailand’s export structure has been changing over 
time, Figure 5 classifies merchandise exports into five categories; 1) Agriculture and Food, 
2) Labor intensive manufacturing, 3) High technology manufacturing, 4) Resource based 
exports, and 5) Other exports. First, it can be seen that Thailand’s export structure has been 
fairly diversified in recent years. Together, the labor intensive and high technology sectors 
account for about 60% of total exports. The other three main categories each account for 
about 14% of total exports. The diversity is further emphasized once it is noted that income 
from tourism is also about 10% of total merchandise exports. 
                                                  
1
 Other crisis affected countries in the region also had similar experiences (Sussangkarn, Flatters, and 
Kittiprapas 1999). 
2 Among countries in Southeast Asia, this is also the case for Singapore. 
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a Calculated at current exchange rate for US$-baht. 
Source: Bank of Thailand.  
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Source: Bank of Thailand. 
Since the mid-1990’s, the total share of labor intensive and high technology manufactured 
exports has been relatively stable, at around or just above 60% of total exports. Between 
these two groups, however, the share of the high tech group has been increasing by about 
10-15 percentage points. Actually, without the crisis, the share of the labor intensive group 
would have declined even more. Prior to the crisis, there was already a lot of talk about the 
labor intensive exporters as being “sunset” industries. The effects of fierce competition from 
cheaper producers, such as the People’s Republic of China and Viet Nam, was already 
being felt prior to the crisis. In fact, intense competition was one factor that caused exports to 
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decline by about 2% in 1996, compared with growth of more than 20% in each of the 
previous two years. This was one reason for the attack on the baht in early 1997, which 
eventually led to the crisis.  






















































































Baht/US$ Adjusted Inverse REER
Note: REER= real effective exchange rate. Inverse REER indicator is adjusted to have the same value (at 1990) as the US 
dollar. 
Source: Bank of Thailand.  
The crisis led to a substantially depreciation of the baht against the US$.  While many other 
regional currencies also weakened, the real effective exchange rate of the bath still 
weakened by a significant amount for a number of years after the crisis (Figure 6). 
Particularly important also was the fact that the People’s Republic of China kept its 
exchange rate fixed to the US$ after the crisis. These changes in the exchange rates gave a 
lifeline to the labor intensive export sectors in Thailand, and they have managed to keep 
going over the past decade or so. In the past couple of years, however, as the baht has 
appreciated from current account surpluses and large capital inflows, the labor intensive 
sectors have found it more difficult to compete again, even ignoring the recent impacts from 
the subprime crisis. 
Apart from the labor intensive manufactured export sectors, the share of total exports for 
agriculture and food exports has also been declining. This depends to some extent on 
commodity prices, and in the two to three years prior to the sub-prime crisis, rising 
commodity prices have helped to slightly increase the export share of this sector, which is 
now around 13.5%.
3 Given that Thailand has a natural comparative advantage in agriculture, 
evidenced by being a top exporter of many agricultural products, such as rice, rubber, 
tapioca, sugar and frozen seafood, there is still room for future growth for Thai agriculture 
and food exports. There is a lot of potential for increasing value added from this sector, 
through improved quality control, value-added processing, packaging and marketing. 
The largest export sector now is the high technology sector. This is in line with the need for 
Thailand to move up the technological ladder, as other countries with cheaper labor take 
over much of the labor intensive export market. Unfortunately, this is not a sector where 
                                                  
3
 Rising commodity prices, particularly oil, also led to the increased share of resource based exports (shown in 
Figure 5) in recent years. 
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Thailand has a natural comparative advantage. The Thai industrial corporate sector tends to 
be strong in areas where Thailand does have some natural comparative advantages, such 
as in food related sectors and in services (tourism related). For high tech products, local Thai 
companies do not have the technological capability to compete effectively with multinational 
corporations. Thailand has relied mainly on a strategy of attracting foreign direct investment 
(FDI) to develop various parts of the high technology sector. Thus, the high technology 
sector is driven mainly by foreign investment with some domestic Thai companies managing 
to link to the supply chain of these products. This strategy has been fairly successful in many 
sectors. For example, while some countries in Southeast Asia opted to go for the 
development of a “national car” a couple of decades ago, Thailand was very open to 
automotive investment from all the major companies. This has made Thailand the largest 
automobile producer in the region, with a particular niche in the pick-up truck segment, 
where Thailand is the second largest producer of pick-up trucks in the world after the US. 
Local companies have also been able to participate extensively in the auto parts industry 
and this has further increased Thailand’s competitiveness in the auto industry. 
Figure 7 shows the share of FDI in total investment. This share has increased after the 1997 
crisis. This is a reflection of the decline in domestic investment from the excessive levels 
prior to the crisis. It is also a reflection of the continued inflow of FDI into Thailand. These are 
the investments that have been driving the high technology export sector as discussed 
above.
4 


































































































Note: Calculated at current baht value. 
Source: Bank of Thailand.  
                                                  
4
 Much of the FDI inflows in the first two to three years after the crisis were not greenfield investment but came 
in to buy existing distressed assets, particularly in the financial sector. 
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Figure 8: Gross Foreign Reserves, 1990–2008 (billions US$) 



























Given that exports have been driving economic growth after the crisis and investment has 
been sluggish, it is not surprising that for most of the postcrisis period Thailand experienced 
current account surpluses. Between 1998 and 2007, the only year Thailand did not have a 
current account surplus was 2005, when the rapid increase in energy prices led to a deficit. 
This also occurred in 2008; again due to a rapid rise in oil prices in the early part of the year 
as well as the indirect impacts of the subprime crisis on exports in the last quarter of the year. 
In the first few years after the crisis, it was crucial for Thailand to accumulate foreign 
reserves. This was in order to recover from the near insolvency resulting from the futile 
attempt to defend the baht, and also to be in a position to exit from the IMF program. 
Thailand managed to exit the IMF program around mid-1999, and fully repaid all the money 
that was borrowed from the IMF package in 2003. Since then, foreign reserves have been 
increasing rapidly (Figure 8). This was not really a conscious decision to accumulate 
reserves as such, but more due to the need to prevent the exchange rate from strengthening 
too much in order to protect the export engine, which has basically been Thailand’s only 
growth engine after the crisis. 
The challenge for exchange rate management became particularly acute in 2006 because of 
large capital inflows into the country. Although the central bank has been buying foreign 
currencies to ease the strengthening trend of the baht, the baht strengthened from about 41 
baht/US$ at the end of 2005 to about 37.6 baht/US$ at the end of the third quarter of 2006. 
The capital inflow became even more rapid in the last quarter of 2006. Between the 
beginning of October 2006 and the middle of December 2006, the central bank intervened 
extensively in the foreign exchange market to buy up foreign currencies that were flowing 
into the country. It was buying an average of about US$800 million per week for 10 
consecutive weeks. Yet, the baht strengthened at the most rapid pace ever, reaching about 
35.2 baht/US$ by the middle of December 2006. 
Because of the baht appreciation, the authorities were under tremendous political pressures 
from businesses to intervene more and more. The loss of export competitiveness through 
currency appreciation from rapid capital inflows was seen to be unrelated to any economic 
fundamentals, and as exports were Thailand’s main engine of growth, the loss of this engine 
would have wide implications for the economy as a whole. So on 18
th December 2006, 
Thailand imposed capital controls on capital inflows by copying measures that Chile had 
8 ADBI Working Paper 154    Jitsuchon and Sussangkarn 
 
used in the early 1990’s. Inflows were subject to a 30% unremunerated reserve requirement 
(so only 70% of the inflows could be invested) and the capital inflow needed to be kept in the 
country for at least one year, otherwise there will be fine equal to 10% of the capital amount. 
The next day the stock market crashed by 15% and the authorities had to reverse the 
controls on those inflows coming to invest in the stock market. 
In hindsight, it seems clear that the authorities did not really understand that a requirement 
to keep the capital inflow in the country for at least one year is extremely severe, because 
very few investors can afford to park their money in one place for that long without the 
flexibility to move it if needed. The inflows also created a lot of distortions and also a lot of 
administrative challenges for the authorities, particularly when different inflows are treated 
differently and there are possibilities of leakages of one type of inflow into another. One can 
argue that when a country has to deal with very large capital inflows (or outflows), capital 
control measures should not be ruled out per se, as they can provide an added valuable 
instrument for the authorities to manage the stability of the economy. However, it is very 
dangerous to simply copy measures that may have worked for some country at some point 
in the past. The financial system changes so rapidly and financial globalization is now much 
more extensive than in the early 1990’s, so measures that might have worked then may be 
counter-productive in the present day. If capital controls are to be introduced then they must 
be very well designed and the authorities must be very sure of how the market will respond 
to them. In the Thai case, the capital controls were eventually removed in March 2008 when 
conditions were more favorable, as the trade balance turned into deficit following large 
increases in world oil prices.
5 
3.  LESSONS FROM THE 1997 ECONOMIC CRISIS 
There are many important lessons that can be drawn from the 1997 crisis.
6 The most 
important is probably that while financial globalization can bring benefits from better access 
to financial resources, it can also bring about a lot of volatilities and risks, and needs 
extremely prudent management. Given Thailand’s past development successes based on 
real sector globalization (through trade and FDI), the country was regarded as an example of 
the so-called “East Asian Economic Miracle” (World Bank 1993), and was praised 
internationally as being a model that other countries should emulate. Given these successes, 
the authorities may have become overconfident, and embarked on policies of financial 
liberalization in the hope of turning Bangkok into a major financial center for the region. 
Unfortunately, there was insufficient understanding of the implications of financial 
liberalization, and an incorrect policy regime was pursued and this eventually led to the crisis. 
The crucial mistake of the authorities was to liberalize capital flows while sticking to a fixed 
exchange rate system and also trying to pursue an independent monetary policy; the classic 
Mundell “impossible trinity” (Mundell 1963). Thailand had successfully used a fixed 
exchange rate system since the end of the Second World War, and this had contributed to 
economic stability and growth for many decades. However, these successes were mostly 
achieved under an environment of modest financial capital flows. The mistake was to stick to 
this old paradigm in the 1990’s when capital flows became very large and very volatile. 
Prior to the crisis, the baht was fixed to a basket of currencies with the US dollar having by 
far the largest weight in the basket. This resulted in a fairly stable baht/US$ rate for many 
years prior to the crisis. However, Thailand also tried to pursue an independent interest rate 
policy. This can be seen from the gap between the Thai overnight inter-bank rate and the US 
overnight federal funds rate. This gap averaged about 4% between January 1989 and June 
                                                  
5
 The new Bank of Thailand Act that was passed in 2006 also provided additional instruments for the Bank of 
Thailand to use for more effective sterilization of exchange rate interventions. 
6
 See Sussangkarn and Vichyanond (2007) for detailed discussions of the crisis and lessons. 
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1997 (the last month before the float of the baht), and sometimes reached up to 10% (see 
Figure 9). With liberalized capital flows, this inevitably led to a large amount of capital flows 
into Thailand. 
Most of these capital flows came in the form of external debt, which rose rapidly from 
US$ 29 billion in 1990 (34% of GDP) to US$ 108.7 billion in 1996 (59% of GDP). Even more 
dangerous was the fact that much of this debt was short-term debt (with a maturity of less 
than one year).
7 By the end of 1996, the total short-term foreign debt was about US$ 47.7 
billion, which was larger than the amount of official foreign reserves at the time which was 
about US$ 38.7 billion. Even after taking into account the foreign assets of the banking 
system, the total foreign assets (official and private) were less than the amount of short-term 
foreign debt of the country. If these short-term foreign debt were not rolled over, there would 
not be enough foreign assets in the country to service these debt. 
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Source: Bank of Thailand and US Federal Reserve Bank. 
These large capital inflows fueled the economic bubble in Thailand. There was excessive 
investment in non-trade sectors, particularly real estate. There was also a lot of crony 
capitalism. Persons sitting on boards of financial institutions also sat on many boards of 
client companies. Banks were lending to clients without sufficient scrutiny. One bank that 
eventually failed, lent almost 60% of its total lending to projects initiated by relatives and 
friends of the owners and managers. Clearly, corporate governance as well as risk 
management needed to be significantly improved in order to avoid a similar crisis in the 
future. 
The authorities were also viewing the economic situation with the wrong paradigm. As 
capital flows increased, the foreign reserves also increased, as the foreign borrowings were 
converted into local currency to invest in the country. The authorities were viewing this as a 
sign of strength and were looking at the adequacy of foreign reserves in terms of the number 
of months of imports that they covered (a current account paradigm). The fact that foreign 
reserves were also needed to cover foreign debt, particularly short-term debt, (a capital 
                                                  
7
 This is related to the provisioning requirement of the Basel Capital Accord; see Sussangkarn and Vichyanond 
(2007). 
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account paradigm) was not well-understood. This was a painful lesson from the crisis. After 
the crisis, the country’s short-term debt has been carefully monitored to make sure that the 
country does not return to a situation anything like the precrisis one. The ratio of foreign 
reserves to external short-term debt has increased substantially, to almost five to one at the 
end of 2008, from less than one to one just before the crisis (see Figure 10). 
































Source: Bank of Thailand. 
To avoid a similar crisis, economic management needs to be much more prudent. The 
authorities need to understand and look out for various risks to the economy. Major policy 
changes (like financial liberalization prior to the crisis) need to be carefully studied to 
understand the full implications and risks involved. It is also very important to carry out 
appropriate sequencing of policy changes.  
Another important lesson is the need to improve the country’s social safety nets to be able to 
respond appropriately to an economic crisis. After the crisis, it was very apparent that the 
social safety nets available at that time were very inadequate. Laid off workers had little 
protection, and fiscal expenditures to cushion the impacts could not be dispersed quickly 
enough. Borrowing from multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank, could not be dispersed quickly enough because of many rules and 
regulations on procurement and disbursement imposed by the lenders. On this issue, 
Thailand was very grateful that the Japanese government came forward with the so-called 
Miyazawa Initiative, providing financial assistance in a way that could be disbursed very 
quickly. Since the crisis, the system of social safety nets has been improved in many areas, 
most notably in the areas of universal healthcare scheme and the unemployment insurance 
under the Social Security System.
8 
                                                  
8
 See Chandoevwit (2006) and NaRanong and NaRanong (2006) for discussions of the social security system 
and the healthcare scheme. 
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4.  IMPACTS OF THE SUBPRIME CRISIS ON THE THAI 
ECONOMY 
In the current subprime crisis, it is fortunate that the Thai financial system was not 
directly affected in a significant way. One small bank had to be re-capitalized because of 
exposures to toxic assets. Most other banks avoided exposures to these assets or were 
exposed just marginally. There were certainly people going round trying to sell the 
various Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) to financial institutions. That the Thai 
financial system avoided falling prey to these toxic assets must be related to the lessons 
that have been learned from the 1997 crisis. From the painful experiences of that crisis, 
the Thai financial sector is now much more risk averse than before. Also being a less 
sophisticated financial system than those in the West, there was little understanding of 
what these debt instruments were, and because of the risk aversion, financial institutions 
avoided them. 
The stock market was of course affected in line with stock markets around the world. As 
financial markets in the advanced economies experienced liquidity crunches, there was a 
massive liquidation of liquid investment assets in the emerging markets and a massive 
outflow of capital. Fortunately, Thailand had more than sufficient foreign reserves to 
cover for this capital outflow, and depreciation pressure on the exchange rate could be 
managed fairly easily. Other countries were not so fortunate, and some countries 
experienced a severe depreciation of their local currency. This shows that it is no longer 
sufficient to think of having enough foreign reserves to cover the current account and 
short-term debt; reserves also need to cover other contingent liabilities, such as foreign 
holdings of stocks and bonds that can be quickly liquidated, converted to foreign 
currency, and then taken out of the country. 
Even though the financial system managed to avoid the direct impacts of the subprime 
crisis, the country is now seriously affected by the crisis indirectly through the trade 
channel. This has become very apparent since the last quarter of 2008. Prior to that, 
Thai exports were still growing rapidly, at more than 20% year on year in US$ value. 
Starting in November 2008, export growth turned negative and has been negative ever 
since. 
As an economy highly dependent on export of goods and services (as was discussed 
earlier), the Thai economy has now been hit hard by the global recession and the 
resulting decline in world trade. After exports grew by more than 20% in the first three 
quarters of 2008, exports declined by about 9.4% in US$ value in the fourth quarter of 
2008 (Table 2). Real GDP declined by 4.2% in that quarter, making the overall growth for 
2008 to be a mere 2.6 %, much lower than the forecasts of around 4-5% before the 
impacts of the subprime crisis were evident. The picture was even worse in the first part 
of 2009. Exports fell by about 20% in the first quarter of 2009, and real GDP dropped by 
7.1%, which is getting close to the level of declines seen after the onset of the 1997 
crisis. 
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(Year-on-year growth in 
%;Nominal in US$) 
Real GDP Growth 
(Year-on-year growth in %) 
2006 18.7%  5.2% 
2007 17.0%  4.9% 
2008 H1  23.3%  5.6% 
2008 Q3  28.4%  3.9% 
2008 Q4  -9.4%  -4.2% 
2009  Q1 -19.9% -7.1% 
a H= Half year; Q= Quarter year. 
Sources: Bank of Thailand and the National Economic and Social Development Board. 
One of the indicators that points to a shrinking economy is the heavily depressed capacity 
utilization of manufacturing productions. Figure 11 shows that capacity utilization rates fell 
across-the-board since the beginning of 2008 and particularly since around the end of the 
third quarter of 2008. As expected, the firms or industries more dependent on the export 
market experienced deeper production declines. Among highly export dependent firms 
(exports greater than 60% of total sales), capacity utilization is now less than 50%. Other 
indicators also move in the same direction; with private investment, private consumption, 
employment, among others, all falling. 
Figure 11: Capacity Utilization Rate of Manufacturing, 













Less Than 30% 30%  t o 60% M ore Than 60%
 
Source: Bank of Thailand. 
Obviously, the growth prospects of the Thai economy will depend on the prospects for 
growth and trade at the global and regional level. While there are signs every now and then 
that the western economies may begin to bottom out in the not too distant future, 
overoptimism about this prospect would be rash. As in the case of the 1997 crisis, even if the 
economy bottoms out, this does not mean that the problems are over. As indicated earlier, 
Thailand bottomed out five to six quarters after the start of the crisis, but it took five years 
before output returned to precrisis level. The decline in the nonperforming loan ratio to less 
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than 10% took even longer; about eight years. Thus, in the case of the subprime crisis, a 
quick return to business as usual appears to be out of the question. 
 
5.  POLICY RESPONSES 
Like governments all around the world that are facing the negative consequences from the 
subprime crisis fallout, the Thai government has responded to the crisis with various 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. 
5.1  Fiscal Stimulus Programs 
There have been six fiscal measures to stimulate the Thai economy, as shown in Figure 12. 
Increased government spending and tax cuts are the most common measures. A special 
Mid-year Budget Act amounting to baht116.7 billion was passed in early 2009, shortly after 
the current government took office. The details of this mid-year budget are in Table 3. There 
are two cash transfer programs amounting to around baht28 billion (about US$800 million); 
baht18.9 billion for living cost subsidies to low-income households and baht9 billion as 
supplementary income for the elderly). 
Figure 12: Fiscal Stimulus Programs 
Source: Fiscal Policy Office. 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
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Table 3: Additional Mid-year Supplementary Budget (Millions baht) 
Projects / Expenditure items  Amount 
Total mid-year supplementary budget   116,700.0 
Economic recovery and confidence restoration  
 1.1 Living cost subsidy for low-income earners and government 
officials  
 1.2 Extension of five measures to reduce living costs  
 1.3 Water resources for farmers and agriculture  
 1.4 Road construction in villages and rural area  
 1.5 Commercial funds for low income earners  
 1.6 Tourism promotion  
 1.7 Small water resource and water management projects 
 1.8 Small- and medium-size enterprise promotion  












Revenue creation, Quality of life enhancement and social security  
 2.1 Free education program for the first 15 years  
 2.2 Social development fund  
 2.3 Monthly allowance for senior citizens  
 2.4 Unemployment reduction and labor potential promotion  
 2.5 Health care promotion  
 2.6 Civil servant and police officers housing scheme  










Expenditure under emergency circumstances  4,090.4 
Treasury cash repayment  19,139.5 
Source: Fiscal Policy Office, Ministry of Finance.  
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Table 4: Tax Measures 
Sector   Policy Details 
Individual Taxpayers   Expand minimum taxable income from baht60,000 to baht1 million, which 
would be subjected to 0.5% tax rate  
Community 
Enterprises  
Income tax exemption for community enterprises with an annual income of 
less than baht1.8 million (previously baht1.2 million) for 58,000 community 
enterprises nationwide (only for income received between 2009 to 2010)  
Venture Capital   Income tax exemption for any gains resulting from a transfer of stock from 
a small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) to venture capitalists (only 
applicable for SMEs with assets worth less than baht200 million, or those 
with less than 200 workers)  
Real Estate   Personal income tax allowance of up to baht300,000 for houses or 
condominiums purchased or transferred in 2009 and tax allowance of up to 
baht100,000 for mortgage interest payment.  
Tourism   Double tax deduction for conference and meeting expenses incurred in 
Thailand  
Investment Fund   Exemption of income tax for dividend income and capital gains from sales 
of SME stock until 2012  
Debt Restructuring   Exemption of income tax and stamp duty arising from debt restructuring 
that takes place in 2009  
Mergers and 
Acquisitions  
Exemption of income tax from merger or acquisition of businesses that 
takes place in 2009  
Source: Fiscal Policy Office.  
Both theory and the experience of some low-income countries indicate that cash transfers 
are among the most effective ways to both stimulate the economy as well as mitigate the 
negative impacts of a crisis on the poor and other vulnerable groups. One caveat is that the 
transfer must be made to the right target groups, that is, any leakage to ineligible recipients, 
such as high-income people, must be kept to a minimum. However, the two transfer 
programs implemented by the current government do not strictly meet this criterion. 
The living-cost subsidies were given to private employees included in the Social Security 
System who earn less than baht15,000 per month. Since all Social Security System workers 
receive wages at or above the minimum wage, and the minimum wage is about twice the 
official poverty line, it is likely that the subsidies did not to go the very poor, who account for 
about 10% of the total population. Most of the poor are those working in the informal sector 
or in agriculture, and are not part of the Social Security System. As the subsidy tended to 
benefit urban low-income workers, albeit not the very poor, the stimulating effect could still 
be high, as the marginal propensity to spend among the urban low-income group is likely to 
be the highest compared to other urban population subgroups. The same leakage problem 
occurs with the monthly allowance for the elderly. Because the allowance is universal (given 
to rich and poor alike), most of it will benefit non-poor elderly people. 
Table 4 summarizes tax measures that have been initiated in response to the current crisis. 
The total tax loss from these measures is estimated at around baht40 billion. The 
effectiveness of these measures in terms of stimulating the economy is expected to be lower 
than direct government transfers, as most taxpayers are not poor. Also, some sector-specific 
tax incentives, such as those in real estate, are more likely to work only if the general 
economy is already on the recovery path. 
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5.2  Monetary Easing 
Again, like in most other countries, monetary policy has also been eased in response to the 
looming economic crisis. In fact, the monetary authorities (the Bank of Thailand) switched its 
position quite abruptly from a fear of inflation following the rapid hike in fuel and food prices 
in early 2008 to a serious concern over an economic downturn in the fourth quarter, when 
indirect impacts from the sub-prime crisis began to hit Thailand’s export. The Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC) decided to lower the policy interest rate on 3 December 2008 by 
100 basis points. By the end of May 2009, there have been three other interest rate cuts, 
amounting to another 150 basis points.  
Most economists agree that loose monetary policy can only play a secondary role in 
revitalizing an economy suffering from rapidly shrinking external demand. The main cause of 
the problem is from vanishing orders from overseas, and lowering the financial cost will not 
do much to help. Actually, the main problem for most firms now is access to credit rather 
than the cost of credit. With the downturn, banks became much more stringent about 
lending. Existing loans may be trimmed or recalled completely and getting a new loan 
becomes very difficult. Loans from abroad, which were a part of the rapid capital inflows a 
couple of years ago, have also dried up as liquidity problems hit the financial system in the 
advanced economies. Thus, getting credit to those that can make productive use of it is 
probably the key problem at this time. This is not an easy problem to solve, as it is not 
straightforward to separate those who can make productive use of the credit from those that 
will quickly be added to the list of nonperforming loans for banks. Of course, one area that 
will really benefit from the low interest rates is the fiscal cost of government spending, as the 
government will be able to finance its rapidly growing debt relatively inexpensively.  
Table 5: Monetary Policy Decisions 
Decision Dates  Announced Policy Interest 
Rate (%)  Decision 
16-Jan-08 3.25  Hold 
27-Feb-08 3.25  Hold 
9-Apr-08 3.25  Hold 
21-May-08 3.25  Hold 
16-Jul-08  3.50  Raise 25 bps. 
27-Aug-08  3.75  Raise 25 bps. 
8 Oct 08  3.75   Hold 
3-Dec-08  2.75  Cut100 bps 
14-Jan-09  2.00  Cut 75 bps 
25-Feb-09  1.50  Cut 50 bps 
8 Apr 09  1.25  Cut 25 bps 
20 May 09  1.25  Hold 
Source: Bank of Thailand.  
One area of monetary policy which is likely to become an issue of heated debate is 
exchange rate management. It is natural for an economy like Thailand, where exports are 
such an important part, that when problems arise for the export sector, such as rapid capital 
inflows leading to significant appreciation of the currency back in 2006/07 or contraction of 
export demand as in the current situation, there will be calls from the export sector (which is 
very vocal) for a weaker exchange rate. This influence is reinforced by the fact that there are 
countries in the region, countries that can be regarded as competitive with Thailand for 
certain products, whose currencies have weakened considerably as a result of the large 
withdraw of capital resulting from the sub-prime crisis, such as South Korea, Indonesia and 
India. Some of these countries have fundamental problems of lack of enough reserves to 
back up the short-term debt as well as the contingent liabilities on reserves as discussed 
earlier. However, what ever the reason for the large depreciation of other countries’ 
exchange rates, the business sector can make a persuasive case that they should also be 
helped by weakening the local currency. 
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There is, therefore, a danger of the whole region, which is generally dependent on the export 
engine, descending into an episode of competitive depreciation. This would benefit no one. It 
would also make it much more difficult to make the adjustments needed to rebalance the 
region’s growth path, to one less dependent on exports, with an increased role for domestic 
demand in economic growth. For example, public infrastructure investment, which will be a 
very important component of growth rebalancing for many economies, will become much 
more costly because it normally has a high import content. 
5.3  Limitations 
Most of the policy responses to the crisis are directed to the short-term need to shore up the 
economy in the face of the economic contraction. Fiscal injections are expected to generate 
greater domestic consumption, which will ease the pain of domestic producers and 
consumers. Not much attention has been paid to how to make the fiscal injections 
sustainable. Even less thought has been given to what a new “rebalanced growth path” for 
the country might look like and how it could be achieved. 
Policymakers seem to hope that the current crisis will be short and that fiscal injections can 
provide a temporary relief before everything returns to normal. As indicated earlier, this is 
likely to be wishful thinking. Even if the US and other western economies hit bottom this year, 
it may take a while before full recovery is achieved. And it is unlikely that a full recovery will 
mean that East Asian exports can play as big a role in East Asian economies as it did before 
the crisis. Thus, some fundamental restructuring of the Thai economy, as well as those of 
other East Asian countries, will be necessary in order to pursue a new growth path which is 
less dependent on exports. This will certainly not be easy and cannot be achieved in the 
short-term. 
If recovery from the crisis is long and drawn out, then the sustainability of the fiscal injections 
will become a major issue. If growth depends mainly on fiscal injections, then to be effective, 
larger and larger injections will be needed each year. If US$10 billion is injected this year 
and the same amount is used next year, then this is basically zero growth. So if a country 
were to rely on fiscal injections to generate growth over an extended period, then it could 
lead to a massive build up of public debt, even though it may have started the crisis with a 
fairly healthy fiscal position. Once the financial situation begins to become normalized, 
interest rates could shoot up, as countries around the world all need to borrow to finance 
their fiscal injections. This could become a major impediment to growth for a sustained 
period, as many countries that went through the debt crisis in the aftermath of the second oil 
shock know only too well. 
6.  STRATEGIES TO REBALANCE GROWTH 
For an export dependent economy like Thailand, the current crisis may be harder to deal 
with than the 1997 crisis. As discussed earlier, Thailand exported her way out of the 1997 
crisis, assisted by the depreciation of the baht. This was a natural recovery path for the 
country, as Thailand, in a similar way to most of the other East Asian economies, is used to 
the export-led growth path. East Asia has followed the export-led development path for 
decades, following the successful example set by Japan. This was regarded as a “flying 
geese” pattern of development (Akamatsu 1962). 
During the 1997 crisis, the advanced economies were not affected much (with the exception 
of Japan which has extensive economic links with other parts of East Asia). Thus, the main 
export markets for East Asian products could provide the demand for increased exports from 
East Asia; from both the crisis affected countries as well as from newly emerging production 
powerhouses, such as the People’s Republic of China. 
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The current situation is very different. The crisis has led to a collapse of world demand for 
exports, which hits at the very heart of the East Asian model of export-led growth. Exporting 
their way out of the current crisis is out of the question for East Asian economies. Indeed, 
many economists view the global imbalance—with East Asia exporting its way to growth, 
creating a huge balance of payment surpluses, and vast accumulation of reserves, while the 
US runs bigger and bigger deficits—as being a partial cause of the subprime crisis and 
subsequent credit crunch. Of course, while the global imbalance may have provided 
excessive liquidity to the financial markets in the West, a much more fundamental cause of 
the subprime crisis, however, is the regulatory failure in the West, particularly the US, that 
allowed a huge explosion of toxic assets, built up from subprime mortgages, throughout the 
financial system. 
It is likely that a sustainable solution to the current crisis will involve not only a strengthening 
of financial regulations everywhere, but also better mechanisms to prevent a build up of vast 
global imbalances, as occurred in the past decade. However, correcting such deep-rooted 
global imbalances takes time, as many major economies or economic groups will have to 
undergo substantial restructuring. For example, economists know that the US economy must 
consume and import less and export more, while East Asia and other major trading partners 
to the US must do the opposite. However, switching from importing to exporting, and vice 
versa, does not involve just changing numbers on paper, but real adjustments at a firm level 
and other microeconomic policy changes, such as retraining laborers to be able to shift to 
new economic sectors, which may require very different skills. 
Another important change that is likely to be needed in correcting the global imbalances is a 
substantial realignment of major currencies. The US dollar certainly needs to be much 
weaker against its major partners’ currencies. Again, this is not an easy adjustment to make. 
East Asia is certainly facing a huge dilemma on this. On the one hand, not implementing 
changes that would prevent a reemergence of huge global imbalances in the future runs the 
risk that a future financial crisis will hit East Asian economies severely, as in the current 
crisis. On the other hand, working to bring about a realignment of currencies, particularly a 
significant weakening of the US$, will mean that East Asia will need to accept a book loss on 
the value of the huge amount of US$ denominated assets that are held by the region. 
Whatever might be the solution to preventing a crisis like the subprime crisis in the medium- 
to long-term, it is clear that East Asia has been forced to make a significant adjustment to its 
development strategy in the short- to medium-term. In the short-term, countries have been 
making sizeable fiscal injections to try to shore up the economy, hurt by the collapse of the 
export engine. The Thai short-term response was discussed earlier. In the medium-term, 
some form of growth rebalancing will be necessary. This does not mean that exports will no 
longer be important to East Asia, as it is very unlikely that much of the production base that 
feeds the global consumer demand for manufactured products can shift back to the 
advanced economies, or that another region could replace East Asia in this production role. 
What rebalancing means is that East Asia needs to rely less on the export engine and 
supplement it with other engines based on domestic demand. This, again, is not that easy to 
achieve. It will require a significant restructuring of various economies, and also the 
implementation of appropriate policies to make sure that domestic demand driven growth, 
such as through investment, does not generate large economic bubbles and current account 
deficits similar to what occurred prior to the 1997 crisis. 
In the case of Thailand, one can say that the economy has not grown in a well-balanced 
manner since the 1990s. During the economic bubble of the 1990s, growth was driven by 
excessive and speculative investment. When the 1997 crisis occurred, Thailand then had to 
rely too much on the export engine to restore growth and overall economic health. The 
current overreliance on exports makes the country highly vulnerable to the current global 
recession, as was already seen from recent export and growth figures. There have been 
discussions in academic and policy circles about rebalancing growth to be more dependent 
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on domestic demand and less on exports. How to achieve these goals, however, is not clear 
and little serious analysis has been carried out on this issue.  
Actually, the issue of Thailand being highly dependent on external trade was discussed 
seven to eight years ago, when the rapid rise in exports, which enabled Thailand to recover 
from the crisis, significantly increased exports’ share of the economy. Many were already 
voicing concerns that the increased dependence on exports makes Thailand more 
vulnerable to the volatilities in both its trading partners’ economic conditions and world trade. 
However, it is difficult to be precise when calculating whether a country depends too much 
on exports. Certainly, there are countries that have much higher ratio of exports to GDP than 
Thailand (Malaysia; Singapore; Hong Kong, China; and Japan, to name a few), and the 
growth experiences in those countries have been very successful. It is true that when 
external conditions deteriorate, the more open economies experience greater transmission 
to the domestic economies (see e.g. Rodrik 1996). However, volatilities from short-term 
external factors does not mean that these export driven economies do not on average 
perform well over time. Actually, the more open, export led economies tended to perform 
better than those which were more inward looking (e.g. Sussangkarn 1997). Certainly, 
having to compete in the export markets can bring about efficiency spillovers. There is also 
evidence supporting the view that, for Thailand, the degree of openness positively affects the 
total factor productivity (TFP) (Tinakorn and Sussangkarn 1998; Sussangkarn, Jitsuchon, 
and Vajragupta 2003). 
Irrespective of the impacts of openness on volatilities and growth, it is clear that the fall out 
from the subprime crisis will mean that Thailand (and other East Asian export led economies) 
will have to accept a reduced dependence on the export engine over the next several years, 
and probably over the course of the medium-term. It is therefore of interest to see what 
might be some of the important strategies to generate sustainable growth given lower export 
dependence. 
One obviously important strategy is increased domestic investment, which will have to be 
mainly public investment as the private sector has been considerably weakened by the crisis 
and there is a large amount of excess capacity in the manufacturing and services sectors. It 
is not entirely clear, however, that an investment led growth strategy can be sustainable. If 
the investment is not excessive, then it should be sustainable. In that case, however, the 
growth generated may not be very high. If investment becomes excessive, then there is a 
danger of large adverse impacts on the current account and external stability. There is also a 
danger of creating a bubble, as was done just prior to the 1997 crisis. So managing the size 
of the public investment to ensure that it is at an appropriate level will be important. The 
quality of these investments will be equally important. Thailand has made wasteful and 
inefficient investments in megaprojects in the past, including both purely public sector 
projects and those given out as concessions to the private sector. This is again a very 
important issue needing careful planning and monitoring. 
There are other strategies that will be important parts of a growth rebalancing strategy. In the 
rest of this paper, we highlight three important strategies from analyses in Sussangkarn, 
Jitsuchon, and Vajragupta (2003). That paper used a computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model of Thailand to carry out policy analyses on how to achieve a moderate average 
growth path, given an assumed decline in the role of exports in the Thai economy. It was 
assumed that the ratio of exports to GDP will decline by about 10 percentage points over a 
five-year time horizon. The paper found that growth would slow down significantly. The 
paper then analyzes various strategies that could increase growth while ensuring 
sustainability in the sense of maintaining external stability. In the analyses, the current 
account was kept fixed for each scenario, with the level of investment being endogenous.  
The analyses highlighted three strategies that will be important for growth rebalancing. 
These are 1) increasing total factor productivity, 2) deepening the production structure of the 
economy and 3) lowering energy dependence. 
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6.1  Improving Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
Improving TFP is the best way to make growth more well-balanced. With higher productivity, 
the country can compete better on a long-term basis. At the same time, higher productivity 
will translate into higher wage rates and higher real income of the working population, 
enhancing the purchasing power of the domestic market. 
In the past, productivity gains in Thailand came primarily from resource mobilization between 
economic sectors, and from the accumulation of physical capital, usually in the form of 
imported technology (Tinakorn and Sussangkarn 1998). Resource mobilization had limits, as 
the country depleted its natural resources at an alarming rate. The ability for people to move 
from low-paid agricultural work to higher-paid industry and service jobs is also approaching 
its limit, as agriculture currently accounts for less than 10% of GDP, and most farmers 
already have substantial non-farm income. Relying on accumulating imported capital is not a 
sustainable way of improving productivity either, as the value-added tends to be small.  
Real productivity gains should come from improving human capital. In this regard, there is 
plenty of room for Thailand to make more progress. The education and training system 
needs to improve a lot. Thailand’s international rankings in education and training lag behind 
its performance in other areas, such as physical infrastructure. Table 6 shows that there are 
many sub-areas in education and training which are troublesome. For example, although 
Thailand has made much progress in secondary enrollment since 1990s, its ranking is still 
low. 
Table 6: International Ranking of Thai Education and Training (Selected Indicators) 
Indicator  World Rank
a 
Quality of primary education  64 
Primary enrollment  61 
Education expenditure  46 
Secondary enrollment  85 
Tertiary enrollment  44 
Quality of the educational system  53 
Quality of math and science education  55 
Quality of management schools  49 
Internet access in schools  42 
Local availability of research and training services 58 
Extent of staff training  51 
a The total number of countries in the sample was 134. 
Source: The Global Competitiveness Report 2008-2009, World Economic Forum (WEF). 
Improvement in scientific and technological capabilities is another important area. 
Investment and expenditures on scientific research and development is low in Thailand 
compared to more advanced countries, and much of the investments that have been made 
have not yielded commercial benefits. There has been great difficulty in linking research and 
development to commercial products. 
6.2  Deepening the Production Structure of the Economy 
Deepening the production structure means reducing the import content of various sectors in 
the economy in order to increase domestic demand. The focus here is more on intermediate 
demand and the stress is not on protectionism, but rather on encouraging a deeper and 
more diversified production base. 
The structural weakness of Thailand’s reliance on exports is that most of the leading exports 
have high import content. As shown in Figure 13 almost half of Thailand’s imports are raw 
materials and intermediate goods. When combined with imports of capital, these two import 
groups account for two thirds to three quarters of total imports. Thailand is clearly a member 
of regional production networks that spread the production of parts to many countries. In 
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theory, this international division of labor benefits all member countries. In practice, however, 
a country will benefit more if more parts are produced within that country, as this lowers the 
import volume while raising export volume. To increase parts production in Thailand, a highly 
developed domestic network of industry clusters must be put in place, and logistical 
arrangements must be efficient.  
 












1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
others consumer products raw   materials capital
 
Source: Bank of Thailand.  
To reduce intermediate imports, the key issue is to increase the productive capacity of local 
producers so that they can increase links to the supply chain of various industries. Thailand 
has seen some successes regarding this in the past for some industries, particularly the auto 
industry. In its early days in Thailand, most of the auto industry was simply the assembly of 
completely knocked down parts imported from abroad. Over time, the share of locally 
produced parts steadily increased. This occurred as local producers improved the quality of 
their products, up to international standards. More FDI in the parts industry, some as joint 
ventures with local companies, also helped this process. The auto sector in Thailand is now 
very competitive with a high local content, and some locally made parts are now exported. 
The production deepening will reduce the ratio of imports to GDP. This reduction of import 
share brings the potential for higher growth. In the CGE analysis, it was found that a 
reduction of total import share of GDP by five percentage points across all import categories 
increased economic growth by an average of 1.6% per annum. The auto industry experience 
is one that Thailand can attempt to emulate in many other industries. This should be an 
important part of the medium-term growth strategy to craft a rebalanced growth path. 
6.3  Lowering Energy Vulnerability 
Import dependence is probably most important when it comes to energy imports. As shown 
in Figure 14, the proportion of imported energy to GDP went up from less than 4% in 1998 to 
12–14% in 2006–2008, an increase by three times in less than a decade. As a result, the 
economy became very vulnerable when energy prices went up, and the vulnerability 
becomes more and more serious. Not having sufficient domestic energy sources is only a 
small part of the problem, using energy inefficiently is a much bigger problem. 
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A policy of lowering energy dependence can also be used to promote new industries and 
contribute directly to growth. For example, the Thai government initiated the so-called “Eco-
car” project in 2007. These eco-cars are small cars (with an engine size, in cubic 
centimeters, of less than 1,300 for gasoline engines and less than 1,400 for diesel engines) 
that can achieve a mileage rate of more than 20 kilometers per liter, comply with both the 
Euro 4 emissions standards and stringent safety standards. The main incentive for the 
development of eco-cars was a reduction in the excise tax from 30% to 17%. After the 
project was announced, seven manufacturers applied to the Board of Investment for 
promotional privileges to carry out an eco-car project. Output was initially due to come to the 
market in late 2009 or 2010. Unfortunately, with the current crisis, this will be postponed until 
market conditions get better. Nevertheless, these fuel efficient and environmentally friendly 
cars should be able to drive a new growth path for the auto industry in Thailand. 
Figure 14: Dependence on Imported Energy (in %) 





























Source: Bank of Thailand and the National Economic and Social Development Board.  
6.4  Other Rebalancing Factors 
There are obviously many other important aspects of growth rebalancing strategies. For 
Thailand, income distribution is another important issue. In terms of income distribution, 
Thailand is among the most unequal countries in the world. The Gini coefficient has 
remained stubbornly above 0.5 during the past three decades. One of the important 
consequences of high inequality is the relatively small size of domestic market, as wealth 
concentrates among only a handful of the rich. A successful redistribution of wealth would 
therefore increase the domestic market size and make growth better balanced. This is 
especially true for a country with moderate average income levels like Thailand. Measures to 
improve income inequality range include fiscal measures, micro credit policies, and equitable 
enforcement of rules of law, among others. Another important by-product of a more equal 
income distribution is the reduction in political polarization, which is damaging Thai politics 
and economy at the moment.  
7.  CONCLUSIONS 
The recovery from the 1997 crisis left Thailand more dependent than ever on exports as the 
main growth engine, with the ratio of exports to GDP increasing from a precrisis level of 
about 38% to about 65% recently. The lessons learned from the 1997 crisis led to a more 
risk-averse financial system, and this helped Thailand avoid the direct impacts of the 
subprime crisis. Being highly dependent on exports, however, Thailand, along with other 
export oriented East Asian economies, is now greatly affected by the indirect impact of the 
subprime crisis on exports. Both exports and GDP fell over the past two quarters. 
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The Thai government has been using fiscal stimulus and monetary easing measures to try to 
shore up the economy. These measures are mostly short-term in nature, and if the subprime 
crisis is protracted, then the sustainability of the fiscal stimulus will be called into question. In 
the medium- to long-term, Thailand needs to move to a more balanced growth path, one less 
dependent on exports (although exports will still be important) and more on other, domestic 
sources of growth. The paper suggests a number of key strategies that could help Thailand 
achieve a more balanced and sustainable growth path. The main strategies include 1) a 
focus on increasing total factor productivity, 2) further deepening the production structure of 
the economy, and 3) reducing dependence on imported energy. In addition, improving the 
country’s highly skewed income distribution will also help to increase domestic consumption 
demand. 
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